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COMMENTS
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY-TRADE AS I
SAY, NOT AS I DO: SEA-LAND SERVICE,
INC. v. ALASKA RAILROAD
The antitrust laws1 provide that any person2 injured by an an-
1 The federal antitrust laws are premised upon the notion "that the unrestrained inter-
action of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and so-
cial institutions." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See generally
Bork & Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)), were designed to further these broad socioeconomic goals, and gener-
ally are regarded as forming the core of substantive antitrust law. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRusT §
3, at 13 (1977). Section 1 of the Act prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in
restraint of trade or commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Similarly, section 2 prohibits the for-
mation of monopolies and proscribes attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. Id. § 2.
Proponents of the Sherman Act were faced with the paradox inherent in the legislation
that Congress was promoting free trade by obstructing it. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1911). Nevertheless, Senator Sherman, the sponsor of the legisla-
tion, insisted that the Act would not interfere with legitimate trade. See 21 CONG. RzC.
2456-57 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). He stated that "[i]t is the unlawful combination,
tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and
not the lawful and useful combination." Id. at 2457.
In 1914, the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), was enacted to deal with specific anticompetitive prac-
tices, such as tying agreements, exclusive dealing contracts and price discrimination. 1 J.
VON KLALINows5, ANTrrRusT LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.0313][a]-[b] (1981). While the
Sherman Act is aimed at destroying anticompetitive practices, the Clayton Act is preventive
in nature. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). Indeed, the very fact that
one has the tools to produce anticompetitive effects may be a violation. International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947); see United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 280, 285 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). Principal among the
Clayton Act's provisions is section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), which prohibits
certain mergers and acquisitions, and is "intended to arrest the anticompetitive effects of
market power in their incipiency." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967);
see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
2 Section 8 of the Sherman Act defines the term "person" to "include corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by" the laws of any state, the United States, or a
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titrust violation may obtain both treble damages$ and injunctive
relief.4 Traditionally, however, these remedies have been unavaila-
ble when the United States is a named defendant because the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity5 has shielded the federal government
foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). The statute encompasses not only corporations, but
individuals and partnerships as well. 3 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 11.01[3]. Con-
struing this language as "very broad," Chief Justice Taft concluded that labor unions fell
within section 8. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 (1922). He
observed that through this definition Congress intended that no "persons or combinations of
persons should escape its application." Id. Accordingly, courts have held corporate officers
and directors to be liable individually for antitrust violations committed on behalf of their
corporate employers. 4 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 24.02[3]. The Clayton Act uses
an identical definition for its provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976).
3 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. The treble damage remedy was
intended to provide victims of an antitrust violation with incentive to sue. Data Digests, Inc.
v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 57 F.R.D. 42, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Indeed, courts have stated
that in providing for such relief, Congress intended "to foster and stimulate the interest of
private persons in maintaining a free and competitive economy," Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord,
246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957), and to allow plaintiffs to act
as "private attorneys general," 57 F.R.D. at 44. See Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster
Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1970); Bernard, On Judgments and Settlements in Anti-
trust Litigation: When Should Damages Be Trebled?, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 5 n.9 (1981).
1 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). At common law, victims of restraints of trade were not entitled
to obtain injunctive relief. See Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 463 (1917). Section
16 of the Clayton Act, however, gives a "person, firm, corporation, or association" the right
to seek such relief against threatened antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). In abolish-
ing the common-law rule, Congress was motivated by a desire to provide an additional
mechanism through which the antitrust laws could be enforced. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ha-
zeltine Research, Inc., 396 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).
' The English maxim that "[tihe King can do no wrong," is regarded by many as the
source of the sovereign immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Jacoby, Roads to the Demise of the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 29 A.B.A. AD. L. REV. 265, 265 (1977). Some commenta-
tors have observed, however, that this maxim originally was understood to mean that the
King must do no wrong because he was not considered to be above the law. See, e.g.,
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YA.E L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1924); Fox, The King Must
Do No Wrong: A Critique of the Current Status of Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25
WAYNE L. REV. 177, 193 (1979); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1963). Nevertheless, the maxim evolved into the princi-
ple that the sovereign cannot be sued unless consent to suit is granted. See, e.g., Jaffe,
supra, at 1. Justice Holmes explained the existence of sovereign immunity without resorting
to the English maxim, stating that "there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353
(1907). Irrespective of its theoretical underpinnings, the doctrine has been regarded as an
anomaly, and as anachronistic in light of the modem policy favoring redress for every legal
wrong. See Hartke v. Federal Aviation Admin., 369 F. Supp. 741, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Fox,
supra, at 196-98; Jaffe, supra, at 2; Smith, Government Accountability, 2 VILL. L. REV. 16,
16 (1956); Comment, Sovereign Irresponsibility, 20 J.B.A. KAN. 275, 283 (1952). Neverthe-
less, it is a well-established principle that absent an express waiver of immunity by Con-
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from incurring any form of antitrust liability. Notably, in 1976,
Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 to
eliminate the defense of sovereign immunity in all actions seeking
nonmonetary relief instituted against the United States, its agen-
cies and its officers." Notwithstanding the APA's abrogation of the
immunity defense, recently, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Alaska
gress, the federal government and its instrumentalities cannot be sued. E.g., Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937);
United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834) (Marshall, C.J.).
When an equitable action is brought against an officer or agency of the federal govern-
ment, acute questions arise as to whether the suit is actually against the officer and not the
sovereign. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S.
643, 645-48 (1962). To resolve these questions the courts look to "the effect of the judgment
or decree which [would] be entered" if the suit were to succeed. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185
U.S. 373, 387 (1902). Accordingly, if a judgment would require an expenditure of public
funds or obstruct public administration, the suit is deemed to be against the sovereign.
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949) (courts will not exercise their "compulsive powers to restrain
the Government from acting, or to compel it to act"). Notwithstanding possible adverse
effects upon governmental administration, however, claims for specific relief can be enter-
tained when the officer has acted pursuant to an unconstitutional power or exceeded his
statutory authority. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963).
6 See, e.g., Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 632 F.2d
680, 687 (7th Cir. 1980) ("no statute grant[s] consent to sue the United States for alleged
antitrust violations"); Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Mass. 1980) (antitrust
count dismissed because a "[s]uit against the United States and its officers cannot be main-
tained without its consent"); cf. Webster County Coal Corp. v. TVA, 476 F. Supp. 529, 532
(W.D. Ky. 1979) (United States "exempt from liability under the antitrust laws").
7 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1976)).
8 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Prior to its amendment in 1976, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1976)), entitled persons who were aggrieved by determinations of government agencies to
obtain judicial review. The circuit courts espoused divergent views as to whether this statute
embodied a waiver of sovereign immunity. Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir.
1974). Although some circuits interpreted the Act as merely conferring the power to review
agency determinations, id.; see, e.g., Littel v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1213 (4th Cir. 1971);
Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1969), other courts held that the statute
waived sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1969).
Recognizing the need for clarity in this area, and intending to foster governmental accounta-
bility, Congress amended the APA to waive sovereign immunity in certain cases. S. REP. No.
996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-10, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6124-30. Hence, section 702 of the Act
now provides that a person, adversely affected by a federal agency, can seek "relief other
than money damages" without suffering dismissal of the action or denial of relief on the
ground that the United States is a party to the suit. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), as amended by
Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721. One commentator has stated
that the APA amendment is the culmination of slow but steady abolition of sovereign im-
munity. See Jacoby, supra note 5, at 266-73.
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Railroad,9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that the federal government is not amenable to suit for
equitable relief in antitrust actions.10 In reaching this conclusion,
the court reasoned that there is no cause of action for the govern-
ment's anticompetitive conduct because "Congress did not place
the United States or its instrumentalities under the governance" of
the antitrust laws.11
In Sea-Land, the plaintiffs filed suit against two private cor-
porations12 and three federal agencies," alleging that the defen-
dants had violated various provisions of the Sherman Act by, inter
alia, forming a conspiracy to monopolize the Alaska shipping in-
dustry.14 Reasoning that the doctrine of sovereign immunity pre-
cluded any award of damages or injunctive relief,, the district
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the federal agencies.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed," holding that the United
States is not exposed to liability for conduct violative of the anti-
trust laws, regardless of whether the relief sought is legal or equita-
ble in nature.1 7 Initially, the court observed that sovereign immu-
nity would not bar an award of equitable relief because of the
9 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982).
10 659 F.2d at 244.
11 Id.
"' Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., [1980-2] Trade Cas. 7 63,481, at 76,523 (D.C. Cir.
1980). The two private corporations in the action were Crowley Maritime Corporation and
Alaska Hydro-Train Corporation, a subsidiary of'Crowley. Id. at 76,523 n.1.
1" Id. at 76,523. The government defendants were the Alaska Railroad, the Federal
Railroad Administration, the Department of Transportation and the chief officers of these
agencies. Id. at 76,523 & n.2.
1" Id. at 76,525. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the antitrust laws by
entering exclusive dealing contracts, establishing predatory shipping rates, conducting an
illegal boycott, and entering illegal tying arrangements. Id. In addition to seeking monetary
damages, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the performance of two executory contracts as well
as the future solicitation of such contracts. Id.
15 Id. The district court determined that neither the Alaska Railroad Act, 43 U.S.C. §8
975-975g (1976 & Supp. I1 1979), nor the antitrust statutes, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-45 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980), constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. [1980-2] Trade Cas. 9 63,481, at
76,523. The court further concluded that the plaintiffs could not resort to either the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976), or the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). [1980-2] Trade Cas. '1 63,481, at 76,523-24. Additionally, the
action was dismissed without prejudice as to the private defendants on the ground that the
Interstate Commerce Commission had primary jurisdiction. Id. at 76,525-27.
"' Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 247. Judge Ginsburg authored the
opinion for the court. The other members of the unanimous panel were Judges Wright and
MacKinnon.
17 Id. at 245.
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waiver embodied in the APA.18 Since the APA states that relief
can be denied on "any other appropriate legal or equitable
ground,"1 however, the court examined the antitrust laws to deter-
mine whether the United States falls within their intended scope.20
Primarily, the Sea-Land court relied on United States v.
Cooper Corp.,21 in which the Supreme Court held that the feder-
eral government was not a "person" qualified to sue for treble
damages.22 In Cooper, the Court intimated that if the United
States was entitled to maintain a treble damage suit, it would also
qualify as a person subject to liability under the antitrust laws.23
The Sea-Land court opined that Congress was aware of this dic-
tum when it subsequently amended the antitrust laws to accord
the government an action for actual damages.24 Because Congress,
after "discrete consideration" of the federal government's status
16 Id. at 244. The APA amendment has generated a conflict among the federal circuit
courts. In Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978), the Second Circuit
stated that the statute does not constitute an independent basis of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and merely abrogates the defense of sovereign immunity when jurisdiction already ex-
ists. Id. at 932. The Third Circuit has rejected this narrow construction of the APA, stating
that the statute waives sovereign immunity for purposes of nonstatutory review of agency
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712,
718 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); accord, Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exch.
Serv., 619 F.2d 1132, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980); Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F. Supp.
1247, 1252-53 (D. Minn. 1979). In concluding that sovereign immunity does not "bar the
way" with respect to equitable relief, the District of Columbia Circuit has adopted the views
of the Third and Fifth Circuits. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245 & n.2.
' 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The waiver of immunity in the APA is qualified in that it does
not permit courts to grant relief in the face of "other limitations on judicial review," or
another statute waiving immunity which "expressly or impliedly forbids the relief...
sought." Id. Although Congress' intent is unclear, one commentator has posited that the
qualifications embodied in the APA waiver are designed to preserve the ability of the courts
to balance equities and to dismiss certain actions for injunctive relief, such as those seeking
to enjoin the collection of taxes. See Jacoby, supra note 5, at 272. The Sea-Land court did
not address the precise scope of the APA's qualified language, but stated that the provision
preserved the judiciary's power to dismiss on the ground that the United States is not
within the ambit of the Sherman Act. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at
245.
20 659 F.2d at 245-46.
21 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
22 Id. at 614.
23 Id. at 606. The Cooper Court stated:
The provision is that "any person" injured by violation of the [Sherman Act] "by
any other person or corporation" may maintain an action for treble damages
against the latter. It is hardly credible that Congress used the term "person" in
different senses in the same sentence. Yet, unless it did, the United States would
not only be entitled to sue but would be liable to suit for treble damages.
24 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245.
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under the Sherman Act, addressed only the direct holding of
Cooper but left its dictum intact, the Sea-Land panel concluded
that it would be improper to hold the United States subject to
liability.25
Although it appeared that government accountability would
be enhanced with respect to equitable relief after Congress
amended the APA, 26 the Sea-Land court appears to have damp-
ened these hopes in the area of antitrust.17 This Comment will ex-
amine the D.C. Circuit's reasons for reconstructing the immunity
wall, and will suggest an alternative to the "do as I say, not as I
do" contradiction into which the Sea-Land court has breathed new
life.
THE Sea-Land COURT'S EXTENSION OF Cooper
The foundation for the D.C. Circuit's construction of the Sher-
man Act was its reliance upon the Supreme Court's Cooper opin-
ion as precedential authority.2 8 Indeed, the Sea-Land court has
merged Cooper's statement of law, that the federal government is
not a person entitled to sue, with its dictum, that liability is also
precluded, concluding that the United States is wholly without the
reach of the antitrust laws.. It is submitted, however, that this
broad interpretation of the Cooper decision is unjustified in light
215 659 F.2d at 246. The Sea-Land plaintiffs contended that the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972), provided authority for the proposition that federal agencies are sub-
ject to suit under the antitrust laws. See 659 F.2d at 246 & n5. In Hecht, three businessmen
brought an action under sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act against, inter atios, the
District of Columbia Armory Board, an agency created by Congress "[p]ursuant to its au-
thority to legislate for the District." 659 F.2d at 246; see 444 F.2d at 932-33. The Hecht
court examined the legislation creating the Armory Board, and concluded that this agency's
activities could "be tested in accordance with the United States antitrust laws." Id. at 947.
The Sea-Land court distinguished Hecht on the ground that the prior decision involved the
District of Columbia, an entity "functionally similar to local authorities [and thus] properly
ranked with other municipal entities" under the antitrust laws. 659 F.2d at 246; see notes
97-108 and accompanying text infra.
11 See Jacoby, supra note 5, at 266.
17 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 244. Although this Comment will
posit that the federal government should be considered subject to the antitrust laws, it will
not be suggesed that the federal government should be susceptible to suit for treble dam-
ages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Since the APA waives immunity only
from equitable relief, see note 8 supra, the defense of sovereign immunity remains available
when treble damages are sought, cf. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 719 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (monetary relief unavailable under APA waiver even if claim
couched in equity).
" Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245-46.
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of other Supreme Court precedent.
When assessing the impact of precedent, a court is given two
options. It can adhere to the doctrine that a case "holds" only so
much as is necessary to sustain the judgment,' or it can apply the
"equally impeccable and correct" principle that the prior decision
"holds" with authority the broad rule upon which the judgment is
based.30 Although neither approach is "wrong,"8 1 the exercise of
this option must reflect judicial temperament, manifested through
intervening cases.3 2 Thus, the cogency of the Sea-Land court's de-
cision to derive from Cooper the broad legal principle that the fed-
eral government is not a person for all antitrust purposes requires
an examination of the Cooper decision as well as intervening judi-
cial thought.
In determining that the federal government is not a person
entitled to bring a treble damage action, the Cooper Court ex-
amined "[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legis-
lative history, and the executive interpretation" of the antitrust
laws. 3 Applying this standard, the Supreme Court observed that
" Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 V rm. L. REv. 395, 395 (1950); cf. Canada Pack-
ers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 385 U.S. 182, 187 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) ("we need not be slaves to a precedent by treating it as standing for more than it
actually decided"). Discussing the "theory of appellate decision," Professor Llewellyn ob-
served that an opinion can be interpreted to say only so much "as is absolutely necessary"
to uphold a judgment. Llewellyn, supra, at 395. Professor Llewellyn noted that such an
approach is "impeccable and correct" since statements which go beyond the specific holding
of a case are unnecessary. Id.
30 Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 395. Professor Llewellyn noted that although precedent
properly may be distinguished or confined to a narrow holding, it is also "correct" to view a
prior case as enunciating broad rules which cover, "with full authority, cases which are
plainly distinguishable on their facts.., whenever the reason for the rule extends to cover
them." Id.; see, e.g., Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 385 U.S.
182, 184 (1966) (per curiam).
S Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 395-96.
3 Id. at 396.
3 United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941). The Cooper Court initially
noted that "there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion" under which the government could
not benefit from "person" status. Id. at 604-05. Rather, the Court stated that an interpreta-
tion of the word "person" requires a deeper examination of legislative intent. Id. at 606.
Rejecting a strict construction of the Act, the Court chose to read the language of the stat-
ute in its ordinary sense, resolving doubts by referring to the policy of the statute and ca-
nons of statutory construction. See id. at 605. After determining that the Act's language
alone was an insufficient basis upon which to reach a conclusion, id. at 606, the Court ex-
amined the meaning of the term "person" in other portions of the Act, see id. at 606-07, the
scheme and structure of the legislation, see id. at 607-08, enactments supplementing the
Sherman Act, see id. at 608-09, prior precedent, see id. at 610-11, and the legislative history,
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the Sherman Act envisioned two means of enforcement, namely,
the prosecutorial authority granted the federal government, and
the treble damages action available to "persons." 4 The Cooper
Court reasoned that since the numerous sections of the Act pro-
vided various methods for the prosecution of violations by the gov-
ernment, it would be unsound to hold that the provision granting a
private right of action also applied to the United States. 5 The
Court concluded, therefore, that the federal government was not a
person entitled to sue for treble damages.3
A year after Cooper was decided, the Supreme Court, in Geor-
gia v. Evans,87 encountered the issue of a state's status as a person
under the treble damages provision. Noting that Cooper espoused
a standard based on "legislative environment,"39 the Evans major-
ity rejected the contention that the word "person" excludes all
see id. at 611-13.
"Id. at 608. The Cooper Court observed that sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act
impose criminal sanctions, see id. at 607, and that section 4 provides for injunctive relief
sought by United States attorneys, see id. The Court then noted that section 5 deals with
service of process, and section 6 authorizes governmental seizure of goods that are the fruits
of an antitrust violation. See id. The Court then focused upon the remaining provision,
section 7, see note 80 infra, and emphasized that this section was the only one which
granted a private right of action. 312 U.S. at 608. Since section 7 evidently was of a different
nature than the other provisions, the Court concluded that a "fair construction of the Act"
indicated that Congress intended to detail separate remedial schemes. See id.
:5 312 U.S. at 608.
8 Id. at 614. After examining the remedial scheme of the Sherman Act, see note 34
supra, the Cooper Court looked to other considerations tending to militate against inclusion
of the federal government within the scope of the term "person." First, the Court observed
that since the word was used to describe criminal liability, it seems "obvious" that the term
was not intended to encompass the United States. 312 U.S. at 607. The Court then looked to
other legislation enacted to supplement the Sherman Act. Id. at 608-10. Section 5 of the
Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)),
which discusses the collateral estoppel effect of equitable actions upon subsequent proceed-
ings, was viewed by the Court as evincing a distinction between governmental proceedings
and private actions. 312 U.S. at 609-10. Finally, the Court examined the original statutory
scheme as introduced by Senator Sherman. Under this version of the Act, the Court ob-
served, section 1 would have enabled the United States to bring various civil actions. Id. at
611. Conversely, section 2 would have entitled "any person" to sue a "person" or "corpora-
tion" for antitrust violations. Id. The Court reasoned that these proposed sections indicated
a congressional intention not to provide the United States with a civil action for damages.
Id.
Id 7 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
"Id. at 160. In Evans, the defendants allegedly had engaged in price fixing in the sale
of asphalt. Id. The State of Georgia, a purchaser of large quantities of asphalt, sought treble
damages under section 7 of the Sherman Act. Id. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying upon the Supreme Court's holding in Cooper.
Id. at 161; see notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
39 316 U.S. at 161.
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governmental bodies.40 Indeed, the Evans Court observed that, un-
like the federal government, states do not have access to the
prosecutorial provisions of the Sherman Act.41 Reasoning, there-
fore, that "[t]he considerations which led [to the Cooper holding]
are entirely lacking" when a state's status as a person entitled to
sue is in issue,"2 the Evans Court concluded that state govern-
ments may sue for treble damages.'3
Similarly, in Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India," a foreign
government sought person status in an action for treble damages.' 5
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Pfizer did not detect a conflict
beween Cooper's holding that the sovereign is not a person and the
Evans Court's view that sovereign states enjoy person status.4 In-
deed, the Pfizer Court observed that the two major cases were ana-
lytically consistent because neither engaged in a "bare analysis of
the word 'person,"' and both employed the same general approach
to the problem of statutory construction. 47 Hence, the Court em-
barked upon a similar examination of the Sherman Act's legislative
purpose and remedial scheme, concluding that foreign govern-
ments are persons qualified to sue.48 Notably, although the Court
in Pfizer considered the analyses of Evans and Cooper dispositive,
neither holding was accorded talismanic significance.'
40 See id. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that Cooper controlled the ques-
tion whether state governments were entitled to sue. Id. at 161-62. The Court emphasized
that "[i]t was not held [in Cooper] that the word 'person,' abstractly considered, could not
include a governmental body." Id. at 161.
41 Id. at 162.
42 Id. The Evans Court observed that a contrary holding "would deny all redress to a
State, when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a State." Id. at
162-63.
43 Id. at 162.
" 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
4 Id. at 309. In Pfizer, the governments of India, Iran and the Philippines brought
actions against six pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. Id. The complaints alleged
that the defendants violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act "in the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of [a] broad spectrum of antibiotics." Id. at 309-10. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, after examining the Supreme Court's decisions in Cooper and Evans, determined that
foreign governments are persons entitled to maintain a treble damage action under the
Sherman Act. Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1976), af'd,
434 U.S. 308 (1978).
4" See Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1978).
47 Id. at 317. The Pfizer Court observed that both the Cooper and Evans decisions
rested upon "the entire statutory context" of the antitrust laws. See id.
41 See id. at 318.
4 Id. at 316-18; 27 EMoRY L.J. 815, 830 (1978). The Pfizer Court found that the reason-
ing of Evans was controlling since foreign and state governments are similarly situated
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Further, courts have declined to extend the Evans and Pfizer
holdings to enunciate the principle that state and foreign govern-
ments are "persons" when governmental liability is in issue?' Al-
though the Pfizer Court determined that foreign nations are per-
sons entitled to sue,51 these entities are not accorded the same
status for purposes of incurring liability.5 2 One court faced with
the question of such liability remarked that notwithstanding Pfi-
zer, prior precedents, holding that foreign sovereigns are not per-
sons subject to suit, remain binding.53 Similarly, when faced with
under the antitrust enforcement scheme. 434 U.S. at 318. Indeed, the Court stated:
The reasoning of [Evans] leads to the conclusion that a foreign nation, like a do-
mestic State, is entitled to pursue the remedy of treble damages when it has been
injured in its business or property by antitrust violations. When a foreign nation
enters our commercial markets as a purchaser of goods or services, it can be vic-
timized by anticompetitive practices just as surely as a private person or a domes-
tic State. The antitrust laws provide no alternative remedies for foreign nations as
they do for the United States.
Id. (footnote omitted).
50 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (despite Evans holding that state
governments are persons, their "act[s] of government" are not prohibited); International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 572 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
afl'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (notwithstanding Pfizer holding that foreign govern-
ments are persons entitled to sue, those governments are not persons subject to suit). Com-
pare Webster County Coal Corp. v. TVA, 476 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (TVA not
liable under the antitrust laws) with United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197,
205 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (TVA is person and therefore may sue for treble damages). In Chatta-
nooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), the Supreme Court held that
cities are persons entitled to sue for treble damages. Id. at 396. In Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the Supreme Court, addressing the issue of munici-
pal liability, accorded a great deal of deference to the Chattanooga holding. Id. at 397. In-
deed, the Court observed that the Chattanooga case appeared to indicate that the term
"person" should include municipalities whether suing as plaintiffs or named as defendants.
Id. Nevertheless, the Lafayette Court qualified its apparent deference by noting that a
countervailing policy consideration could lead to a contrary conclusion. The Court stated:
[T]he conclusion that the antitrust laws are not to be construed as meant by Con-
gress to subject cities to liability under the antitrust laws must rest on the impact
of some overriding public policy which negates the construction of coverage, and
not upon a reading of "person" or "persons" as not including them.
Id. (footnote omitted).
1 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978); see notes 45-49 and
accompanying text supra.
82 International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553,
572 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afl'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550
F.2d 68, 78 n.14 (2d Cir.) (decided before Pfizer case), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977);
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970)
(decided before Pfizer case).
83 International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553,
572 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). Notably, after examining the Pfi-
zer decision, the OPEC court chose to "refrain from extending the Pfizer ruling beyond the
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the issue of state governmental liability, the Supreme Court has
refused to extend its holding in Evans, that states are persons enti-
tled to sue, beyond its narrow legal sphere." Rather, the Court has
resolved the question of liability by looking to "the purpose, the
subject matter, the context, and the legislative history" of the anti-
trust laws in light of the state activity in issue.55 Thus, notwith-
standing its status as a person when acting as a plaintiff, a state
will be subject to suit only in limited factual contexts."
It is submitted that the decisions bridging the temporal gap
between the Cooper and Sea-Land opinions militate against the
D.C. Circuit's view that a person analysis, predicated upon the spe-
cific holding in Cooper, can supplant a thorough examination of
the antitrust laws. It is further suggested that if a general rule is to
emerge from Cooper, it is that the courts must approach the ques-
tion of governmental liability by looking to the various indicators
of statutory construction enunciated by the Supreme Court. Signif-
icantly, however, the Sea-Land court did not rely on Cooper and
its progeny for the general principles of statutory interpretation
espoused therein.57 Rather, the D.C. Circuit appears to have disre-
garded these principles, choosing instead to elevate the specific
holding of Cooper, that the United States may not sue for treble
damages under the Sherman Act,5 to the rubric that the federal
government is not subject to any of the proscriptions of the anti-
strict confines of that case." Id. Recognizing the surface anomaly in holding that foreign
governments may be plaintiffs but not defendants, the OPEC court nevertheless regarded
its conclusion as consistent with analogous holdings of the Supreme Court. Id. at 572 &
n.19.
. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
5 Id. at 351; accord, Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1320 (8th
Cir.) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); New Mexico v. American
Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1974). Faced with the question of a state's liabil-
ity under the antitrust laws, the Parker Court did not give dispositive effect to the Evans
holding that states are persons entitled to sue. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351. In-
deed, the Court indicated that the liability of state governments must not be measured by
"the literal meaning of the words 'person' and 'corporation.' " Id. Rather, the Court followed
the general standard of statutory interpretation enunciated in Cooper, see note 33 and ac-
companying text supra, by examining the purpose and legislative history of the Sherman
Act. 317 U.S. at 351. Concluding that the legislation was designed to affect only business
practices, the Parker Court held that notwithstanding Evans, a state's sovereign activities
are not within the ambit of the Act. Id. at 352.
Compare .Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975) with Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). See generally notes 97-108 and accompanying text infra.
' See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245-46.
58 See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 614 (1941).
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trust laws. 9
THE Sea-Land COURT'S RELIANCE UPoN LEGISLATIE
ACQUIESCENCE
In relying upon the fact that "Congress addressed only the di-
rect holding" of the Cooper decision by amending the Clayton Act
in 1955 to grant the United States a right of action for actual dam-
ages, 0 the Sea-Land court apparently regarded Congress as acqui-
escing in the Supreme Court's dictum that the federal government
is not subject to antitrust liability.61 Although Congress did not ad-
dress this dictum directly, the legislative history of the 1955
amendment contains statements voicing extreme disapproval of
the Cooper decision. 2 Indeed, some members of Congress noted
that it was always assumed that the federal government was a per-
son, and that the legislation was considered a means to return the
United States to that status6 e
Moreover, the Sea-Land court's reliance upon congressional
acquiescence seems tenuous, for it has been recognized that legisla-
tive silence provides only a dubious means of ascertaining legisla-
59 See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245-47.
'o Id. at 245. In 1955, Congress amended the Clayton Act to accord the federal govern-
ment a right of action for actual damages. See Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 282
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The amendment provides that
"[wihenever the United States is... injured in its business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor in the United States district court
... and shall recover actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The
amendment was the result of congressional disapproval of the Cooper decision. See 101
CONG. REC. 5129-30 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Celler and Rep. Keating).
81 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245.
82 See 101 CONG. REc. 5130 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Keating); id. at 5131 (remarks of
Rep. Rogers); id. at 9165 (remarks of Sen. Kilgore). Representative Keating denounced the
"absurd" situation that the United States, "by far the largest single purchaser of goods and
services," was not entitled to sue for treble damages. Id. at 5130 (remarks of Rep. Keating).
He referred to the Cooper holding as a "loophole in our antitrust laws [that] must be closed
immediately." Id.
"' See id. at 5130 (remarks of Rep. Keating); id. at 5131 (remarks of Rep. Rogers); id.
at 9165 (remarks of Sen. Kilgore). Senator Kilgore stated, "[i]t was believed, up until [the
Cooper decision], that the existing statute, in referring to 'any person,' included the Govern-
ment of the United States." Id. at 9165 (remarks of Sen. Kilgore). Representative Rogers
was equally explicit in expressing his desire to return the federal government to its original
status as a person:
[T]he Committee on the Judiciary has recommended that the Federal Govern-
ment be given the position of a person so that they may institute suit against
individuals and corporations who may have engaged in a conspiracy to violate the
Sherman-Clayton antitrust laws. That is the first objective of this legislation ....
Id. at 5131 (remarks of Rep. Rogers).
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tive intent.64 The questionable nature of legislative inaction is en-
hanced when an explanation for such silence is supplied.6 5 It is
suggested that the legal principles surrounding sovereign immunity
provide an explanation at least as plausible as that proffered by
the Sea-Land court.
One principle firmly imbedded in the common law is that
waivers of sovereign immunity from actions for money damages
must be express; 6 courts will not imply such waivers.6 7 When the
Cooper Court "assumed the United States was not exposed to lia-
bility under the Sherman Act" for treble damages, 58 it was mindful
of this legal principle.69 Indeed, one ground for the Court's refusal
to render the government a person entitled to sue was its fear that
See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960). Frequently, courts have
criticized the practice of relying upon legislative inaction as a means to ascertain congres-
sional intent. See Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253, 272 (2d Cir. 1962); Aleut Corp. v.
Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 421 F. Supp. 862, 866-67 (D. Alaska 1976). Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has noted that this type of analysis "affords the most dubious foundation for
drawing positive inferences," 361 U.S. at 310-11, and serves as "a poor beacon to follow in
discerning the proper statutory route," Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969). On one
occasion, the Court went so far as to remark that it "is at best treacherous to find in con-
gressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); accord, Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 533-34 (1947).
Because of the unreliable nature of legislative silence, courts have refused to regard
Congress' failure expressly to reject administrative interpretation as acquiescence in the
agency's interpretation, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
unless it is clear that Congress was aware of the administrative policy. Chisholm v. FCC, 538
F.2d 349, 362 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d
154, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Similarly, when legislation is proposed which would overrule case
law, the legislature's failure to enact the proposal cannot be regarded as supportive of the
prior judicial action. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960); accord, Helvering v.
Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432 (1941).
"' Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 421 F. Supp. 862, 867 (D. Alaska 1976);
see, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (silence paved "two different roads" of
interpretation); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1960) (alternative meaning
provided by congressional subcommittee discussion); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61,
70 (1946) (congressional silence was as consistent with "a desire to leave the problem fluid
as... with an adoption" of a rule of law); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan, 500 F. Supp.
770, 775 (D. Md. 1980) (court will not venture to speculate in either of two directions of
interpretation).
66 E.g., United States v. New York Rayon Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947); Penn v. Schles-
inger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
'7 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,
4 (1969); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 386, 389 (1850); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1973); see California
v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 200, 227-28 (1976).
" Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 246; see United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941).
6 312 U.S. at 606; id. at 619 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting).
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such a determination would have signified that the government
was a person susceptible to suit.7 0 Clearly, if the Court had be-
stowed person status upon the government, such a decision would
have constituted an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.7 1 Simi-
larly, Congress may have chosen not to affirmatively confer person
status upon the federal government in 1955 because it was not pre-
pared to waive sovereign immunity by expressly making the gov-
ernment subject to antitrust liability.7 2 Notably, the Cooper Court
70 Id. at 606. Noting that the term "person" applied to both the defendant and plaintiff
provisions in the antitrust laws, the Cooper niajority reasoned that unless Congress intended
this word to mean different things in the same sentence, the federal government "would not
only be entitled to sue but would be liable to suit for treble damages." Id. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Black challenged this conclusion, observing that "[o]ther principles [would]
be material if such a question ever should be presented.., the most important [being] that
of sovereign immunity." Id. at 619 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting). Thus, it seems that the Cooper
Court's reluctance to hold that the federal government qualified as a person entitled to sue
stemmed from its belief that such a determination also would mean the government would
be a person susceptible to suit, and in light of sovereign immunity, this could not have been
what the legislature intended, for the waiver was not express. See notes 66 & 67 and accom-
panying text supra.
7'1 See Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 632 F.2d 680,
687 (7th Cir. 1980). In Champaign-Urbana, the Seventh Circuit addressed the antitrust
liability of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. Id. at 681. The court initially noted
that sovereign immunity barred the relief sought absent statutory consent to suit which
would not be found by implication. Id. at 687. After examining the legislative history of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976), the court determined that this stat-
ute was not intended to include the federal government. 632 F.2d at 688. Hence, the court
concluded that the Act did not embody a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 687-89.
Through this analysis, it appears that the Seventh Circuit equated creation of governmental
liability under the antitrust laws with a waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, the court's
reluctance to find that the federal government fell within the scope of the Act appears to
have been predicated upon a belief that such a holding would have amounted to an implied
waiver of immunity.
7' The Supreme Court, in United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1976), ad-
dressed the issue of whether a federal employee could maintain an action against the United
States under the Classification Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 443 (1986) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 5101 (1976)). 424 U.S. at 393. The statute stated that its purpose was "to provide a
plan for classification of positions whereby ... the principle of equal pay for substantially
equal work [would] be followed." 5 U.S.C. § 1501(1)(A) (1976). The plaintiffs claimed that
they had been classified improperly, 424 U.S. at 393-94, and, therefore, sought reclassifica-
tion of their civil service positions and backpay for the period of their alleged wrongful
classification. Id. at 394. Initially, the Court reiterated the long-standing principle that waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity will not be implied. Id. at 399. It then determined that the Classi-
fication Act did not expressly make the United States liable. Id. Thus, it appears that the
Court concluded that Congress simultaneously had created no substantive right of action
under the Act and had not waived sovereign immunity. See id. at 399; Hill v. United States,
571 F.2d 1098, 1102 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978); Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F. Supp. 1247,
1253 n.11 (D. Minn. 1979).
Although many courts regard the creation of a substantive right as independent of a
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appeared to treat these two concepts-a waiver of immunity and
person status-as functional equivalents.7 3 It seems futile, there-
fore, to speculate as to which of these two notions motivated con-
gressional silence. Nevertheless, the Sea-Land court has engaged
in such speculation, holding that Congress' silence proceeded from
an affirmative desire to withhold person status from the
government. 4
It is suggested that a wiser course would have been to concede
that the inaction of the 1955 Congress could have been motivated
by sovereign immunity, and that, in light of the APA waiver, the
basis for such silence may have been removed. This change in cir-
cumstances, therefore, seems to necessitate a de novo examination
of congressional intent with respect to the government's status as a
person.7 5 It is submitted that the legislative purpose, context and
history of the Sherman Act demonstrate that the United States is
within the reach of the antitrust laws.
waiver of immunity, see, e.g., Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F. Supp. at 1253, such
independence can occur only after the legislature waives sovereign immunity. Hill v. United
States, 571 F.2d 1098; 1102-03 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit has explained these
concepts by referring to the Testan decision:
The Court in Testan. . . interpret[ed] Congress' failure to grant the substantive
right as synonymous with a refusal to waive sovereign immunity. In many suits
(.. [these concepts] are not identical. For example, with respect to certain inten-
tional torts ... sovereign immunity bars a cause of action that otherwise states a
claim .... Similarly, Congress can waive sovereign immunity as to a category of
actions without also granting the substantive right .... This appears to be the
precise import of the [APA waiver].
These two, normally distinct concepts . . . merge in cases such as Testan
where there is neither a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity ... nor specific,
legislatively sanctioned rights .... In such cases, relief is available only if Con-
gress by statute creates a substantive right. Such a statute can be said simultane-
ously to create a substantive right and to waive sovereign immunity as to the ac-
tion appropriate to enforce it.
Id. at 1102 n.7 (citations omitted). It seems apparent, therefore, that since the 1955 amend-
ment to the antitrust laws preceded the APA waiver of immunity, making the government a
person in 1955 would have simultaneously created a right of action under the antitrust laws
and waived sovereign immunity. It is submitted that this concern may have spurred con-
gressional reluctance to amend the definition of person to include the federal government in
1955. See generally notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
7- See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941); see notes 33-36 and
accompanying text supra.
74 See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d at 245.
71 See generally note 64 and accompanying text supra.
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GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: THE SHERMAN ACT'S PURPOSE, CONTEXT
AND HISTORY
The Sherman Act was designed to curb the rapid and rampant
growth of corporate superstructures after the Civil War.7 6 It was
aimed at the inequality of wealth, opportunity and living condi-
tions which grew out of the concentration of capital." It is clear
that the paramount concern of Congress in passing the Sherman
Act was to prohibit those commercial practices which fostered this
accumulation of wealth .7  Thus, Senator Sherman, the sponsor of
the legislation, stated that "[t]he object of [the] bill . .. [was] 'to
declare unlawful trusts and combinations in restraint of trade and
production.' ,,79 It appears that anticompetitive activity, the evil
sought to be eliminated by the Act, was the prime consideration of
Congress in enacting the legislation.80
76 1 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRusT LAWS OF THE UNrrFD STATES v (1949).
The Sherman Act was a legislative response to the surge of American industrialization and
the rise of the corporate structure occurring between the years 1830 and 1890. Id. Among
these corporate powers were the Beef Trust, the Standard Oil Trust, the Steel Trust, the
Sugar Trust and the Whiskey Trust. United States v. Trans-Missouri Ass'n, 166 U.S. 291,
319 (1897). In addition, there were a number of corporate superstructures that were not
known as trusts, but nonetheless caused the same anticompetitive effects. Id. at 319-20.
Included among these entities were the railroad and transportation conglomerates. See
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 329-32 (1904). The Sherman Act was
designed to harness these corporate powers while serving as a "charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In defending his bill, Senator Sherman empha-
sized that combinations tending to frustrate competition, effectively destroying the small,
"humble" businessman, were the focal points of the legislation's aims. 1 E. KfNT m FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.8, at 177 (1980) (quoting 21 CONG. Rc. 2569 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Sherman)).
'" Carlston, Role of the Antitrust Laws in the Democratic State, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 587,
592-93 (1952); Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. the Entrepreneur: Redefining the Entities Sub-
ject to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1244, 1246 (1977).
78 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). In Standard Oil, Chief
Justice White traced the common-law history of the antitrust laws, concluding that the stat-
ute evolved because existing economic conditions gave birth to undue restraints of trade,
and therefore embraced every conceivable class of activity which had such a restraining
effect. Id.
708 1 H. TOULMIN, supra note 76, at 7 (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Sherman)).
8o Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 604 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 419-20 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Chief Justice Burger has stressed that the nature of the anticompetitive activity in
issue appears to have been of greater concern to the Sherman Act Congress than the govern-
mental status of potential defendants:
It strikes me as somewhat remarkable to suggest that the same Congress which
"meant to deal comprehensively and effectively with the evils resulting from con-
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To further its procompetitive purpose in the context of an
ever-changing economic environment, the legislature consciously
employed"1 the broadest of language. 2 Indeed, the language em-
ployed in the antitrust laws is so comprehensive, it has been char-
acterized as "more nearly [that of] a constitutional provision than
a statute."' The use of such sweeping language indicates that the
legislature, unable to foresee all potential situations, used words of
general import in order to encompass every scheme that might be
devised to accomplish an unlawful end.84 Quite clearly, the legisla-
ture considered the judicial branch of government an active part-
ner in this statutory scheme by entrusting to the courts the duty to
mold the antitrust laws to accomodate the needs of a dynamic
economy."'
tracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade," would have allowed
[municipalities] to complain of such economic damage while baldly asserting that
any similar [economic] harms they might unleash upon competitors or the econ-
omy are absolutely beyond the purview of federal law.
Id. at 419; cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Su-
preme Court "has heretofore focused on the challenged activity, not upon the identity of
the parties to the suit").
Legislation enacted subsequent to the Sherman Act appears to have placed even greater
emphasis on anticompetitive activity. For example, although section 7 of the Sherman Act
provided that a person injured by anticompetitive activity could maintain an action against
"any other person," see Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), the Clayton Act
liability provisions are framed in terms of activity, see Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731
(1914). Since section 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed and replaced by the broader Clay-
ton Act provision, see Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, 69 Stat. 282, under the present antitrust
remedial scheme, a person may obtain monetary relief when injured "by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws .... .." See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, an aggrieved party may obtain injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by
a violation of the antitrust laws. . . ." See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis
added). Notably, neither the treble damage provision nor the section providing for injunc-
tive relief mandates that a potential defendant be a "person." It is significant, therefore,
that the express language of the antitrust laws recognizes activity as the gauge of liability,
thus permitting an interpretation inclusive of any entity that engages in anticompetitive
conduct. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 398; United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
", Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 & n.10 (1940); E. CuRTIs, MANUAL OF
THE SHERMAN LAW § 131, at 64 (1915).
82 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83 1 H. ToULMIN, supra note 76, at v; see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
787 (1975); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
84 E. CuRns, supra note 81, § 131, at 64.
" Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940); W. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRusT AcT
AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1914); H. THORELLi, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLicy 228-29
(1955). As recently as 1978, the Supreme Court noted that the Sherman Act "established a
broad policy, to be administered by neutral courts, which would guarantee every enterprise
the right to exercise 'whatever economic muscle it can muster. . . ."' Lafayette v. Louisi-
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It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have executed this
responsibility through principles of construction conducive to flex-
ible application of the antitrust laws.86 The courts have interpreted
the provision describing "persons" subject to the antitrust laws, for
example, as "inclusive rather than exclusive," 87 and have eschewed
a semantic approach to the term "person" as not comporting with
the laws' expansive legislative purpose.8 It is against this back-
ground that the federal government's liability must be assessed.
When the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted, the gov-
ernment was much less involved in proprietary activity than it is
today, 9 and, thus, it is likely that Congress never anticipated that
the United States would violate the antitrust laws.90 Nevertheless,
it appears settled that the courts have been given the power to
apply the antitrust laws to situations which were unforeseen at the
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1978) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
" National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); see
Carlston, supra note 77, at 594-96; Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for
Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 83-84 (1974). A prime example of judicial
action which fosters flexibility with respect to the Sherman Act is the rule of reason, 435
U.S. at 688, which provides that a commercial activity can "be taken out of the prohibitions
of the statute upon the theory of its reasonableness," Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 67 (1911). This flexible approach is deemed necessary because a literal interpretation
of the statute's language, that every contract or combination that restrains trade is illegal,
"would outlaw the entire body of private contract law," since every agreement restrains
trade. 435 U.S. at 687-88; accord, Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241
(1918) (nearly every trade organization imposes restraints on its members' business affairs).
" Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 n.9 (1978); see Georgia v. Ev-
ans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942); cf. Commissioner v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1
(1934) (under Revenue Act of 1926, use of verb "include" in definitional section connotes
that the class embodies more than has been enumerated).
" Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 (1978); see Georgia v. Evans,
316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942).
"' White, Participant Governmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact
or Fiction?, 50 TEx. L. REV. 474, 498-99 (1972). Governmental enterprises take the form of
public ownership, but usually are operated independently of governmental policy. A. WALSH,
THE PUBLIc'S BusiNEss 1 (1978). These businesses commonly take the form of public au-
thorities, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, and provide water, gas, electricity, and
transportation services and facilities. Id. By the latter part of the 1940's, approximately 100
enterprises were owned or financed by the government. F. GanvAsi, BIG GOVERNMENT 142
(1949). The number of such government businesses has been growing steadily for the past
50 years. A. WALSH, supra, at 1. See generally A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE
113-42 (1976).
90 White, supra note 89, at 498; see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 399 (1978); id. at 420 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434
U.S. 308, 322 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943);
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 615 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); Slater, supra
note 86, at 84-85.
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date of enactment.91 It seems, therefore, that just as the courts find
that certain novel anticompetitive activities can fall within the am-
bit of the Sherman Act,9 2 the judiciary should not hesitate to find
that an entity can, by its conduct, bring itself within the antitrust
laws.
Finally, the Supreme Court has observed that "[e]very viola-
tion of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system
envisaged by Congress." 93 Thus, it is manifest that to excuse the
federal government from impending or continuing anticompetitive
conduct by immunizing it from the injunctive power of the courts
would thwart the very purposes of the antitrust laws.9 It is sub-
mitted that this is perhaps the strongest argument for permitting
plaintiffs to obtain equitable relief, for "the general purpose [of a
statute] is a more important aid to [its] meaning than any rule
which grammar or formal logic may lay down." 95
91 It appears that since the Sherman-Act Congress principally was concerned with com-
mercial practices, the law's application to governmental entities was not considered. See
Slater, supra note 86, at 84-85; note 90 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has determined that numerous other governmental bodies fall within the
statute's scope. See notes 37-56 and accompanying text supra. In Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), for example, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
recognized that Congress "sought to establish a regime of competition" through its enact-
ment of the Sherman Act. Id. at 398. Observing that this broad goal gave the Act flexibility,
id. at 406, he reasoned that it was permissible to conclude that local governments fall within
the ambit of the statute, id. at 408.
Justice Brennan's recognition of such statutory flexibility appears to echo his senti-
ments concerning constitutional law. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), the Justice stated that regardless of what the framers of the Constitution thought of
Bible reading in public schools, the relevant inquiry is always whether such an activity
"threaten[s] in our day those substantive evils the fear of which called forth the Establish-
ment Clause ... ." Id. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It is submitted
that since the Sherman Act often is compared to the constitution because of its broad, flex-
ible language, see notes 82-83 and accompanying text supra, its application also should be
"responsive to. . . contemporary society." 374 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring). It ap-
pears, therefore, that the absence of explicit congressional direction regarding the Act's ap-
plication to governmental entities should not preclude a finding that the United States is
subject to its proscriptions.
92 See generally Note, The Facial Unreasonableness Theory: Filling the Void Between
Per Se and Rule of Reason, 55 ST. JOHN's L. RaV. 729, 752-58 (1981).
93 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
See In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1087 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Comment, Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman Act and the "Government Action"
Immunity Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 140, 156 (1971).
,' United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J.) (citation omitted).
Describing the law of statutory interpretation as "Thrust and Parry," Professor Llewellyn
set forth twenty-eight canons of construction for which there were equally established rules
running directly contrary. See Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 401-06. For example, although
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EXTENT OF LIABILITY
It is not suggested that the United States should be amenable
to suits for injunctive relief for all forms of governmental activity.
Since the antitrust laws are designed to proscribe only commercial
practices having anticompetitive effects,96 logic would dictate that
the federal government's sovereign activities should remain beyond
the reach of the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court has made a
similar distinction in the area of state action, articulating stan-
dards for gauging the liability of states and municipalities. 97
Under the state action doctrine, the conduct of a state is re-
garded as immune98 when it is viewed as the act of a sovereign
"[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law will not be extended by construction," it is also
true that "[s]uch acts will be liberally construed if their nature is remedial." Id. at 401.
Notwithstanding this amalgam, the underlying purpose of a statute is at the forefront of any
question of statutory interpretation or construction. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285
(1933) (Cardozo, J.); California v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 200, 227-28 (1976). Indeed, Justice Frankfurter once stated:
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy,
to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that
policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of
the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose.
F. FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE MEANING OF STATUTES 20 (1947). This appears
to be true particularly when the antitrust laws are construed. See Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940); E. CURTIs, supra note 81, §§ 121 & 130.
" See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144, 4146-47 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 1982); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408-13 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., plurality opinion); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-92 (1975);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
" Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978); Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 350-51 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); White, supra
note 89, at 479. Although the terms "exemption" and "immunity" have been used inter-
changeably by both courts and commentators, Saveri, The Applicability of the Antitrust
Laws to Public Bodies, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 217, 227-28 (1970); White, supra note 89, at 476; see,
e.g., Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Mass. 1980) (use of "exempt" where "im-
mune" would be more accurate), these words embody distinct concepts. Saveri, supra, at
218. Antitrust immunity describes activities or parties which were never intended by Con-
gress to come within the scope of the antitrust laws. White, supra note 89, at 476. Antitrust
exemption describes conduct or parties which ordinarily would fall within the Sherman Act
but have been declared to be exceptions. Id.
While many exemptions to the antitrust laws exist, see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1976)
(agreements between the Secretary of Agriculture and private citizens are exempt); 46
U.S.C. § 814 (1976) (certain agreements in shipping industry are exempt), they are not to be
implied lightly. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359 (1963). For a comprehen-
sive list of cases in which the courts have refused to imply exemptions, see Alabama Power
Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., 394 F.2d 672, 681-82 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, C.J., dissenting), cert.
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government, and the acts of a municipality are similarly shielded
when they are sanctioned by a state policy of displacing competi-
tion with regulation or "monopoly public service." 99 In Parker v.
Brown,100 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a marketing pro-
gram organized pursuant to a California statute designed to "con-
serve [the] agricultural wealth of the [s]tate." 101 The Court deter-
mined that "the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit" the
exercise of such legislative programs since they can be considered
the acts of a sovereign state.0 2 Because the Parker opinion ap-
peared to grant blanket immunity to states committing antitrust
violations, it was severely criticized.10 3 In a later case, however, the
Court rejected the contention that a governmental entity automat-
ically will escape liability under the state action doctrine by virtue
of its status.10 4 The Court held that a state agency can fall within
the scope of the Sherman Act when it voluntarily joins in what is
essentially a private anticompetitive activity.0 5 Subsequently, this
approach was extended to municipalities, when the Court held that
these entities are liable for antitrust violations unless the chal-
lenged activity is authorized or directed by a state.110 Thus, the
standard embodied in the state action doctrine appears to preclude
liability when the allegedly illegal activity occurs pursuant to a
denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968).
An example of immune activity is conduct which falls within the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. See White, supra note 89, at 474-75. This doctrine states that efforts to influence
the legislature or executive to take particular action do not constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961). See gen-
erally Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Trans. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1970).
For a critical comment on this doctrine, see Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The No-
err-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. Rv. 333 (1967). A second example of immune activity
is the state action doctrine. See White, supra note 89, at 476-79; text and accompanying
notes 99-108 infra. Immunities, like exemptions, from the antitrust laws will not be implied
lightly. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978).
9 Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion).
100 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
101 Id. at 346. The California Agricultural Prorate Act authorized the establishment of
programs which would restrict competition among growers. Id.
102 Id. at 352.
"' See, e.g., Slater, supra note 86, at 73.
104 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-92 (1975).
101 Id. at 790.
108 See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144, 4146-47 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 1982); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion).
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"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed ... state pol-
icy."'1 7 It is suggested that this doctrine would provide a useful
framework within which the federal government's proprietary ac-
tivities can be scrutinized in accordance with the antitrust laws.108
CONCLUSION
When the federal government enters the marketplace, it di-
vests itself of its sovereignty and, in essence, becomes a trader.109
The government's role in the commercial sphere increasingly has
projected the United States into the dominion of the antitrust
laws. To effectuate the purposes of those laws, it seems that the
courts must adopt an enlightened approach to statutory interpre-
tation. Indeed, Professor Llewellyn has urged that when "a statute
is to be merged into a going system of law. . . the court must do
the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of the
statute-or else substitute its own version of such policy. Creative
reshaping of the net result is thus inevitable."110
Thomas R. LaGreca
.07 435 U.S. at 410 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
208 In 1974, a presidential task force was established to investigate the various immu-
nity and exemption doctrines promulgated under the antitrust laws. Antitrust Exemptions
and Immunities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1880 (1977). This group was
formed to scrutinize the exclusions from antitrust coverage and to discern which were suita-
ble for reform. Id. In its report, the task force recognized the tremendous increase in govern-
mental proprietary activity, at the local, state and federal levels. Id. at 1889. The group
acknowledged the conflict between governmental enterprises and the antitrust laws, id., ob-
serving that "the government owner regards its corporation's activities as 'political,' and
hence completely outside the scope of laws regulating business conduct, while the federal
government regards the enterprise's activities as 'commercial,' and thus subject to the anti-
trust laws." Id. After citing the United States Postal Service as a prime example of "plainly
commercial activity," id. at 1889, the task force concluded that
[The] more reasoned approach to the question whether government enterprise
should be exempt from antitrust laws is to ask whether the state-run enterprise is
engaged in a plainly commercial activity or business .... If the activity is "polit-
ical," it should be exempt without regard to corporate form. However, if the activ-
ity is "commercial," the enterprise ought to be subject to ordinary commercial
rules, including the antitrust laws.
Id. at 1890 (footnotes omitted).
109 See, e.g., In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1086
(N.D. Cal. 1979).
110 Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 400.
